Perspectives on Religious Freedom fiom the Vantage Point of the European Court of Human Rights by Fuhrmann, Willi
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 3 Article 6
9-1-2000
Perspectives on Religious Freedom fiom the
Vantage Point of the European Court of Human
Rights
Willi Fuhrmann
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, European Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Willi Fuhrmann, Perspectives on Religious Freedom fiom the Vantage Point of the European Court of Human Rights, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 829
(2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss3/6
FUR-FIN.DOC 9/25/00 9:36 PM 
 
829 
Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Vantage 
Point of the European Court of Human Rights 
Willi Fuhrmann∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the 
Court”) was established in 1959 to interpret and apply the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“Convention”), which opened for signature in 1950 and 
entered into force in 1953. The Convention has now been ratified 
by forty-one European states, including most recently Russia, 
Ukraine, and Georgia. The ECHR’s jurisdiction covers a geographi-
cal area with a population of some 800 million. 
The Convention was designed to give binding effect to some of 
the rights and freedoms set out in the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It was unprecedented in international 
law in three important respects. First, it empowered states to bring 
before an international tribunal other states alleged to have violated 
the rights of their own citizens. Second, it recognized individuals as 
subjects of international law by giving them the right to petition di-
rectly an international body with complaints directed against a state 
or states. Finally, it set up an enforcement mechanism to ensure that 
the contracting parties to the Convention respected their engage-
ments.1 
Before going into an analysis of the Convention case law relating 
to freedom of religion as protected in Article 9, I should just say a 
word about the nature of the ECHR’s jurisdiction. The Convention 
system is a subsidiary one; as the Court has often repeated, it is pri-
marily for the national authorities to secure the protection of the 
 
 ∗ Judge, European Court of Human Rights. I thank the Symposium organizers for 
inviting me as a representative of the European Court of Human Rights to participate in this 
Symposium. 
 1.  I will not go into the original structure of that machinery. Suffice it to say that since 
November 1, 1998, a new full-time Court has been in place. 
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rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. There are two main 
aspects to this. One is practical: an international Court cannot act as 
a court of first instance or even a court of appeal, or it runs the risk 
of being submerged by a massive case load. Moreover, national au-
thorities are often better placed to make the initial assessment of 
what is necessary. 
The second aspect is more directly related to the philosophy un-
derlying the Convention. The Convention is predicated on the exis-
tence of a community of democratic states governed by the rule of 
law. Within this system, the Court operates as a fail-safe to catch 
those violations of fundamental rights that escape the scrutiny of the 
national review bodies. In so doing, it owes a degree of deference to 
the decisions of democratically elected bodies, sometimes expressed 
as a margin of appreciation accorded to the national authorities. The 
margin is variable in the sense that the closer you get to the core val-
ues of democracy, the narrower the margin will be. Thus, for exam-
ple, in relation to the freedom of expression, interference with politi-
cal expression will attract a narrow margin, whereas interference with 
artistic expression on grounds of morality will qualify for a much 
wider margin of appreciation. In other words, we could say that 
while a democratic society cannot, consistent with the Convention, 
restrict the pure exercise of democracy, it can legitimately decide 
within reason where art crosses over the line of obscenity or blas-
phemy. This margin operates in particular in relation to the rights 
and freedoms set out in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, which 
include the right to a private family life and the freedoms of expres-
sion, religion, and association. 
II. THE ARTICLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
The articles of the Convention (and Protocol No. 1 to the Con-
vention) that expressly refer to freedom of religion—the so-called 
“religious” articles—are Article 9, which guarantees freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion; Article 14, which prohibits dis-
crimination on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language, or re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth, or status; and Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which safeguards the right to 
education. 
Religious freedom under the Convention is protected by Article 
9, which reads: 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teach-
ing, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the pro-
tection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.2 
Among Articles 8 through 11, Article 9 stands out in several 
ways. Within Article 9 are enshrined the two main elements of the 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The first is the internal 
element, namely, the freedom of an individual to be free in his own 
thoughts and conscience and to join a religion. The second element 
is the external element, namely, the freedom to express to the out-
side world one’s religion or beliefs. Only the second element of this 
freedom, the aspect of external manifestation, may be subject to limi-
tations. No interference by the state is allowed with regard to the in-
ternal element, which is an absolute and unlimited freedom. This is 
clearly reflected in the wording of the permissible restrictions. 
III. CASE LAW ON THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, 
AND RELIGION 
There is a relatively small amount of case law on the question of 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, because, for a long 
time, the ECHR did not have the occasion to give any rulings on the 
matter. 
A. Kokkinakis v. Greece 
The first case that gave the Court the opportunity to consider 
the application and interpretation of Article 9 was Kokkinakis v. 
Greece,3 which involved the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for 
 
 2. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.  The first paragraph 
of Article 9 reproduces Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 3. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
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proselytism because he had “engaged in discussion” the wife of the 
cantor of the local orthodox church. The Court stated the following 
principle: 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within 
the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
[religious] believers and their conception of life, but it is also a pre-
cious asset for atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned. 
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.4 
The fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed in Article 9, 
paragraph 1 were thus recognized by the Court. The Court also ac-
cepted, in principle, that the right to try to persuade one’s neighbor 
as to religious belief is included in the “right to manifest one’s relig-
ion.” Further, the Court found it necessary to draw a distinction be-
tween bearing witness and improper proselytism in order to not 
make the right to change one’s religion or belief a dead letter. In 
Kokkinakis, the right to change one’s religion was also indirectly in 
question. The right to change one’s religion is part of the internal 
element of freedom of religion, but it is also inherently part of the 
external element, namely, the freedom to manifest one’s religion and 
the right to preach. In the seven years since Kokkinakis, approxi-
mately fifteen cases have come before the Court, most of which con-
cern the religious component of Article 9. 
B. Manoussakis and Others v. Greece 
Another Greek case, Manoussakis and Others v. Greece,5 involved 
the prosecution and conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses for establish-
ing and operating a place of worship in Greece without the required 
authorizations from the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs 
and from the ecclesiastical authorities required by a law enacted in 
1938.6 
The Court found that the Greek legislation that led to the appli-
cants’ convictions was aimed at restricting the activities of religious 
 
 4. See id. at 17. 
 5. 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. 1346 (1996). 
 6. See id. at 1351-53. 
FUR-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:36 PM 
829] European Court of Human Rights 
 833 
faiths outside of the Greek Orthodox Church7 and “had such a direct 
effect on the applicants’ freedom of religion that it cannot be re-
garded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, nor, accord-
ingly, as necessary in a democratic society.”8 The Court accordingly 
found a violation of Article 9. 
The Court went quite far in this case, holding that “[t]he right 
to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes 
any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether reli-
gious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legiti-
mate.”9 If the first part of that affirmation is consistent with the ab-
solute nature of the internal element of Article 9, I submit that the 
second part should be read narrowly, so as not to conflict with the 
restrictions that are permissible under the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 9, in relation to the external element of freedom of belief. 
C. Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, Valsamis v. Greece, 
and Efstratiou v. Greece 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 provides: “No person shall be denied 
the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it as-
sumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in con-
formity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”10 
The religious dimension of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 lies in its 
guarantees of the right of parents to have their religious and philoso-
phical convictions respected where the education of their children is 
concerned. In this context, one can find two judgments in which the 
Court found no violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. First, in 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen,11 parents with strong Christian 
beliefs objected to compulsory sex education lessons in Danish state 
schools and challenged the policy before the Court.12 
In affirming that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 enjoined the state 
to respect parents’ religious and philosophical convictions in their 
 
 7.  It should be noted that the Greek Orthodox Church enjoys a special relationship 
with the Greek government. 
 8. Id. at 1366. 
 9. Id. at 1365. 
 10. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 2. 
 11. 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). 
 12. See id. at 7, 18-20. 
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children’s education, the Court explained that the state is obligated 
to ensure the communication of information and knowledge in an 
objective and pluralistic manner. States are not allowed to seek to in-
doctrinate.13 However, the sex education lessons, which the legisla-
tion had intended to be imparted to pupils, did not amount to in-
doctrination or advocacy of a specific kind of sexual behavior.14 
Second, in Valsamis v. Greece15 and Efstratiou v. Greece,16 two 
students were suspended from school for their failure to attend a 
school parade commemorating the war between Greece and Italy in 
1940. This refusal was based on the religious beliefs of the students 
and their parents, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses.17 The Court held 
that the applicants’ pacifist convictions could not have been offended 
by the parade, its purpose, or the arrangements for it and observed 
that pacifist objectives and the public interest were served in such 
commemorations of national events. Accordingly, the obligation to 
take part in the parade did not offend the parents’ religious beliefs, 
and the penalty of suspension did not amount to an interference with 
the students’ freedom of religion.18 
In this context, the primary obligation imposed by Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1 on states is found in the first sentence, namely the 
right to education. It appears that the “respect” referred to in the 
second sentence is of a “qualified” nature. There will no doubt be 
some reluctance on the part of the Court to impose solutions on 
states which would entail excessive expenditure. 
D. Hoffmann v. Austria 
Article 14—the Article prohibiting discrimination of any kind—is 
also one of the Convention’s “religious” articles. A case from 1993, 
Hoffmann v. Austria,19 illustrates this point very well. The applicant, 
a Jehovah’s Witness, alleged violations of Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the 
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 120 because the Austrian 
 
 13. See id. at 24-27. 
 14. See id. at 28. 
 15. 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. 2312 (1996). 
 16. 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. 2347 (1996). 
 17. Efstratiou, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. at 2352; Valsamis, 
1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. at 2317. 
 18. Efstratiou, at 2357-62; Valsamis, at 2322-25. 
 19. 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 20. See id. at 57-60. 
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Supreme Court refused to grant her custody of her children after her 
divorce. The Austrian Supreme Court awarded custody of her two 
children to their Catholic father.21 The Court concluded that “the 
children’s welfare” would be better served if they stayed with their 
Catholic father because Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse to authorize 
blood transfusions, and it was likely that they would become “social 
outcasts” as Jehovah’s Witnesses.22 The Court considered the case 
from the standpoint of Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 14, 
and held that a distinction based essentially on religious considera-
tions was unacceptable. The means employed were not proportional 
to the legitimate aims pursued by the Austrian Supreme Court.23 
E. Darby v. Sweden 
A violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1, which guarantees the right of property, was found 
by the Court in Darby v. Sweden.24 In Darby the applicant claimed 
that his obligation to pay a tax to the Church of Sweden, although 
he was not a member, violated Article 9 and infringed upon his free-
dom of religion. He worked in Sweden but was not entitled to the 
partial exemption accorded to residents under the Dissenters Tax Act 
because he was a nonresident.25 The Court did not find it necessary 
to examine the applicant’s complaint of a violation of Article 9, tak-
ing the view that the case was about discrimination with regard to a 
tax and that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.26 
F. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria and Wingrove v. UK 
Another question that the Court had to decide was to what ex-
tent interference with the freedom of expression, secured under Arti-
cle 10, may be justified to protect the religious beliefs of others. Two 
cases are relevant here: Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria27 and 
 
 21. See id. at 53-54. 
 22. Id. at 54. 
 23. See id. at 58-61. 
 24. 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990). 
 25. See id. at 7. 
 26. See id. at 12-13, 15. 
 27. 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
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Wingrove v. UK.28 In both cases, the applicants came into conflict 
with blasphemy laws. In the Otto-Preminger case, the applicant insti-
tute tried to show a film that offended the Catholic religion and the 
religious feelings of the people of Tyrol, a region that consists of a 
large majority of Catholics in whose lives religion plays a very impor-
tant role.29 The authorities had banned the showing of the film in an 
art cinema and confiscated the film. The Court held: 
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their relig-
ion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious 
majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from 
all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of 
their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doc-
trines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious 
beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may 
engage the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to 
ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Arti-
cle 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in ex-
treme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying 
religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such be-
liefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.30 
Therefore, in the opinion of the Court, the Austrian Courts had 
not overstepped their margin of appreciation.31 The Austrian au-
thorities had been entitled to act to prevent what might be perceived 
as unwarranted and offensive attacks on the religious beliefs of the 
overwhelming majority of religious believers in Tyrol—Roman 
Catholics. Under these circumstances, there had been no violation of 
Article 10.32 
In Wingrove the applicant challenged the refusal of British au-
thorities to grant a distribution certificate for a videotape. The au-
thorities determined that the videotape, which portrayed the cruci-
fied Christ in acts of a sexual nature with a nun,33 violated blasphemy 
laws. The Court noted that, although blasphemy laws are still in 
force in various European countries, the application of these laws has  
 
 
 28. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. 1937 (1996). 
 29. See Otto-Preminger, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8-9. 
 30. Id. at 18. 
 31. See id. at 22. 
 32. See id. at 21. 
 33. See Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. at 1943-44. 
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become exceedingly rare and strong arguments have been advanced 
in favor of abolishing them. 
However, there is as yet not sufficient common ground in the le-
gal and social orders of the member states of the Council of Europe 
to conclude that a system whereby a state can impose restrictions on 
the propagations of material on the basis that it is blasphemous is, in 
itself, unnecessary in a democratic society and, thus, incompatible 
with the Convention.34 
This does not mean that any blasphemy law, irrespective of its 
content, or every measure repressing antireligious sentiment or every 
penalty relating to the same will be compatible with Article 10.35 
There must exist a balance of proportionality between the manner in 
which the antireligious sentiment is expressed and the state’s repres-
sive measures and penalties.36 
One may be tempted to conclude from these cases that where 
there are competing Convention interests, considerable weight is at-
tached to the Article 9 interest. The Otto-Preminger case seems to 
indicate that freedom of expression will give way to the freedom of 
majority religious beliefs. This appears to be at odds with the empha-
sis that the Court has placed on the pluralism in a democratic society 
of religious belief encompassing skepticism and agnosticism, which 
was demonstrated, for example, in the Kokkinakis case. Thus, Otto-
Preminger should perhaps be seen in the light of its particular facts 
and the wide margin of appreciation accorded in consequence of 
those facts. In essence, the Court seems to indicate in these cases, 
particularly in Wingrove, that the relationship between freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion should be decided by democratic 
governments and, hence, the especially wide margin of appreciation 
granted by the Court. 
G. Buscarini & Others v. San Marino 
The Court had the opportunity to develop its analysis of the 
meaning of religious freedom in a more recent case, Buscarini & 
Others v. San Marino.37 This case concerned the obligation imposed 
 
 34. See id. at 1957. 
 35. See id. at 1958-59. 
 36. See id. at 1959. 
 37. 1999-___ Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Judgments & Dec. ___ (1999) (available at 
<http://www.echr.coe.int> (visited Mar. 29, 2000)). 
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on newly-elected members of the General Grand Council (parlia-
ment) of the Republic of San Marino to swear an oath of loyalty on 
the Holy Gospels. The General Grand Council ruled that the oath 
sworn by two new members, without referring to the Gospels, was 
invalid and ordered them, on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary 
seats, to retake the oath on the Gospels.38 The new members com-
plied with the order but applied to the Court claiming an infringe-
ment of their freedom of religion and conscience. The Court held 
that there had been a violation of Article 9 because freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion also implies the freedom to hold or 
not to hold religious beliefs and the freedom to practice or not to 
practice a religion. Therefore, the obligation to swear an oath on the 
Gospels was a limitation within the meaning of the second paragraph 
of Article 9; requiring elected representatives of the people to swear 
allegiance to a particular religion was not compatible with Article 9.39 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Let me try to draw some conclusions from this brief survey of the 
Court’s case law. Because of the dearth of cases, the Court’s case law 
on the question of freedom of religion is less extensive than case law 
concerning other rights guaranteed by the Convention. But the 
Court has, in these small number of decisions, established that free-
dom of thought, conscience, and religion are fundamental to the 
Convention. The Court’s approach in these cases follows the phi-
losophy, which runs throughout the Convention, of securing plural-
ism and tolerance as the hallmarks of democratic society and of re-
specting the values of a pluralist society and the individual’s right to 
self-identification and self-determination. 
Guided by this concern, the Court has, in its case law, protected 
the rights of minority religious groups when confronted with a 
dominant religion, but it has also had to recognize the responsibility 
of states to protect the religious sensibilities of the majority. A bal-
ance had to be found in cases where this led to a potential conflict 
with other Convention rights. Perhaps in the future the Court will 
have to define precisely the different elements of Article 9 and, in 
particular, what amounts to “religion,” given the growth in the  
 
 
 38. See id. at 3-4. 
 39. See id. at 8-9. 
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